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Introduction
I shall argue that, given the plausibility of some of the basic tenets of just war the-
ories, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is morally wrong, and that those 
most directly and strongly responsible for it deserve to be punished in approxi-
mate proportion to their harmful wrongdoings related to this human rights atroc-
ity.1 Furthermore, the U.S., which is most directly responsible for such war crimes, 
owes substantial reparations to Iraq for the damages it has violently wrought on 
that nation.2 This is not to deny that certain other countries owe reparations to 
Iraq for their service as contributory causes to the invasion and occupation there-
of. However, my focus shall be on the major culprit of that continuing evil state 
of affairs.
Implied in this argument is the idea that those who have the authority and influ-
ence to prosecute or to have prosecuted those who are accused of war crimes are 
morally inept and stand blameworthy for their not serving the aims of justice. 
This would include current U.S. president Barack Obama, who repeatedly refuses 
to initiate or even encourage the prosecution of the primary agents of the previ-
ous U.S. presidential administration, and this after he campaigned in part on the 
claim that such crimes ought to be prosecuted. His since stated reasons for not 
looking backward include his wanting to look forward in order to address imme-
diate concerns, ones that he implicitly believes are more important than doing 
justice for hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis killed by U.S. soldiers at the 
1   I am grateful to the audience at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University 
of Belgrade, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the 
Editors of Philosophy and Society for their incisive comments on this article.
2  For a philosophical account of war crimes that emphasizes a humanitarian rather than a 
justice-oriented approach, see May 2006.RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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order of Obama’s predecessor. Presumably, another reason is that Obama does 
not want to risk the political fallout from such a trial. Again, if this is his reason-
ing, he is placing a greater value on the “peace and stability” of a country that has 
perpetrated a significant measure of genocide on Iraq for several years over the 
victims of Iraq’s genocide. 
In addressing the question of war crimes against Iraq, the following questions 
must be answered: On what grounds is the invasion and occupation of Iraq moral-
ly wrong? Who is primarily responsible (liable) for it? What are the damages owed 
that have accrued from the harmful wrongdoings? And what are the appropriate 
punishments or penalties for those significantly responsible for it? Finally, what, 
if any, reparative compensation might be owed to the victims of U.S. aggression 
against Iraq? All the while, we must bear in mind John Kleinig’s words that “war-
time atrocities may lead us to revise our ideas about human depravity and the se-
verity of punishments which can be acceptably inflicted.”3 
I make several assumptions. First, while the post World War II International Mili-
tary Tribunal failed to list the declaring of an unjust war as either a war crime or 
a crime against humanity, I shall assume that it falls under the latter category, if 
not the former one. Moreover, I assume that the many quandaries that plague 
proportionalism in punishment discussed in recent years by Michael Davis, An-
drew von Hirsch, Jesper Ryberg4 and many others do not significantly effect my 
rather underdetermined sentencing proposals for such war criminals. For while 
my proposed punishments might be criticized by some for not constituting pro-
portionately stronger punishments, they are nonetheless quite strong compared 
to some historical cases of prosecuted war crimes. Moreover, the problems asso-
ciated with proportional punishment more generally do not rule out the possibil-
ity that we can “get it (reasonably) right” in this or that particular case of punish-
ment. I also assume that the moral agents in question have both significant power 
to effect change in U.S. foreign policy, and that they genuinely had the ability to 
do otherwise than what they did in the circumstances in question. Or, at the very 
least, I make the compatibilist assumption about moral responsibility that even if 
they lack the ability to do otherwise and do not satisfy the principle of alternative 
possibilities,5 they at least satisfy the sufficient condition of acting with higher-
order volitions6 in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In other words, I assume 
that those persons under discussion in terms of punishment or compensation 
are significantly morally responsible in the retrospective liability sense for that of 
3   Kleinig 1973: 124.
4   Ryberg 2004.
5  The principle of alternative possibilities states that it is a necessary condition of moral 
responsibility that an agent have the ability to do otherwise than what she did, failed to do, or 
attempted to do, as the case may be at the time that she performs the act, omission, or attempt.
6   Frankfurt 1988.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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which so many throughout the world accuse them. I also assume that the institu-
tion of punishment, though fallible, is itself morally justified. And I assume that 
capital punishment is among the harshest of punishments that can legitimately 
be inflicted on robustly responsible humans duly convicted of the worst crimes 
possible, such as crimes against humanity and severe war crimes. With these and 
some further related assumptions in mind, I shall now focus on the matters of es-
tablishing the prima facie liability responsibility for severe harmful wrongdoings 
to Iraqis and who should be punished for them, and how.
It is important that I steer clear of some major problems in responsibility theo-
ry. One is that of collective responsibility ascriptions, especially in times of war. 
As Sanford Levinson cautions, “Great difficulties emerge when one considers the 
question of criminal responsibility for actions occurring within an organizational 
context.”7 He goes on to argue that “If one wants to preserve the force of the notion 
of war criminality, he must find discrete criminals or else argue that in fact every-
one is guilty and deserving of punishment.”8 I adopt the first strategy, and seek to 
identify some of the various individuals most directly and strongly responsible for 
the unjust military invasion and occupation. In doing so, I remain consistent with 
the idea that U.S. government officials most closely aligned with the invasion and 
occupation will be judged according to their behavior that intentionally, know-
ingly, and voluntarily caused these states of affairs. While due process will have to 
determine whether or not such officials are deserving of punishment for their de-
grees and kinds of responsibility for the invasion, I shall base my attributions of 
responsibility on the rather commonly known media statements that many of the 
accused have made for the past several years. Thus the morally odious practice of 
strict liability is avoided. And here the distinction between line and staff officials 
is crucial.9 I am concerned with those officials who are the most powerful and least 
able to claim, like Nazi military officers during the post-World War II war crimes 
tribunals, that they are exempt from responsibility because they are simply “fol-
lowing orders.” I am mostly concerned with those having the most authority or 
role responsibility and who are most able to effect change in regard to the Iraq case, 
and their respective kinds, levels and degrees of liability for wrongful harm to Iraq.
Why the U.S. invaded and occupies Iraq
On 10 October 2002, the U.S. Congress granted power to the U.S. president to de-
clare war, ostensively because former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussain committed 
human rights violations and must be punished for them (which he was), because 
Iraq posed a security threat to the U.S. in that it possessed weapons of mass de-
struction, and because Iraq supported terrorism against the U.S.. These constitute 
7   Levinson 1973: 246.
8   Levinson 1973: 251.
9   Levinson 1973: 259–260.RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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the official reasons for the commencement of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” on 19 
March 2003. This is not to deny that there exist, contrary to the admission of U.S. 
officials, yet other reasons for the invasion.10
Now let us consider these reasons for invading Iraq. For if such arguments are rea-
sonable all relevant things considered, then the punishment of war crimes would 
not apply to the very declaration of war by the U.S. so much as to the processes 
of the conflict. But if the reasons given for invading Iraq fail to justify it on mor-
al grounds and if there are indeed inadequate moral grounds for the invasion of 
Iraq by the U.S., then not only the conduct during the invasion and occupation 
are condemned and must be punished, but so must the very act of declaring the 
“war” in the first place. 
As noted, the then U.S. president and his administration gave as one of its reasons 
for invading Iraq that Iraq possessed either weapons of mass destruction, or the 
essential elements for producing and using them. This point is meant to support 
the idea that Iraq poses a serious threat to U.S. security. Much of the claim re-
volved around the assertion made repeatedly by Bush administration officials and 
even in the National Intelligence Estimate, deemed dubious by many of us back 
then and now known by even many Bush supporters to be specious, that Iraq ob-
tained some of the elements to manufacture weapons of mass destruction from 
an African country. Even if true, why this is a good enough reason for the violent 
invasion of a sovereign nation is morally puzzling, especially in light of the fact 
that every country or nation in the world needs protection against the U.S. given 
its long train of domestic and international human rights violations since its very 
inception and given its use of weapons of mass destruction since the World War II 
era. Even so, let us continue to consider the U.S. case for the invasion of Iraq even 
though no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq prior to the invasion 
and even to this day. 
A related reason given for the invasion of Iraq focused on Hussain. President Bush, 
vice-president Cheney, secretary of defense Rumsfeld, secretary of state Rice, and 
former secretary of state and chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell, head 
of homeland security Tenet,11 among others, argued vociferously and repeatedly 
10   It is recently argued that the “Israel lobby,” a loose coalition of pro-Israel political groups 
exerts an undue influence on U.S. politics, including on the decision to invade Iraq (Mears-
cheimer and Walt 2007). While the authors make a compelling case in favor of the claim 
that such a lobby is in part responsible for the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, this fact 
does not supplant the proposition that one of the other primary contributing factors for this 
human rights atrocity is also the desire to thieve Iraq’s oil, contrary to their vague and weak 
arguments against the oil thesis (Mearscheimer and Walt 2007: 254–255).
11   George Tenet called the evidence for Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction a 
“slam dunk,” when in fact it is to this day rather weak at best.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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that Hussain was a human rights violator and must be stopped. But surely if the 
evidence could be adduced to support the U.S. claim concerning Hussain, then 
the U.S. could have brought the evidence to the International Criminal Court and 
had Hussain tried for human rights violations. After all, it is not as if the U.S. has 
never used its military, political and economic power to affect its will over such 
institutions. But why not settle for an elaborate search and capture mission that 
it’s most elite navy seals could have effected (and did effect) in securing Hussain 
instead of a military invasion of grand proportions? 
The U.S. also insisted that Iraq was linked to anti-U.S. terrorism, another claim 
that was never adequately substantiated and was eventually retracted by even the 
Bush administration itself. It also assumes that, even if the claim were true, that 
the U.S. government is not the legitimate target of terrorism in part because it 
has engaged in state terrorism against not merely a few countries during the past 
few decades alone. Such moral presumptuousness is what prevents most U.S. citi-
zens from understanding the genuine reasons for terrorism against the U.S.. In-
deed, most U.S. citizens are ignorant of the possible causes of anti-U.S. terrorism 
(known to CIA agents as “blowback”), and its possible moral justification.12
The inference to the best explanation for the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq 
includes one or more of the following: the U.S. thirst for oil to the point of outright 
theft by the killings of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian noncombatants 
(that is, “noncombatants” until the U.S. military invasion of their sovereign na-
tion at which time many sought to defend their homeland13), motivated by the 
Bush family’s strong and long-term investments in oil, the embarrassment that 
the terrorism of 9/11 posed to the U.S. political leadership and its desire to cre-
ate the illusion in the minds of U.S. citizens and others that the U.S. government 
is doing something in response to 9/11, and of course the official plans to invade 
Iraq crafted and adopted during the Clinton administration. Many believe that a 
Bush family vendetta against Hussain fueled the invasion, though I shall not give 
this point attention for reasons of charity. For even on a charitable interpretation, 
it is clear that the reasons given publicly for the invasion are morally dubious. Still 
others believe that the protection of Israel in the Middle East is important to U.S. 
interests in the region, a point that is disputed by some experts on U.S.-Middle 
East policy.14 Let us bear in mind that Osama bin Laden made it crystal clear that 
the primary reason for the 9/11 attacks to which the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq was a U.S. response was due to the U.S.’s support of Israel.
12   For discussions of these topics, see Corlett 2003: Chapters 5–6; Honderich 2004; Wilkins 
1991.
13   As John Rawls states, “Decent peoples have a right to war in self-defense” (Rawls 1999: 92).
14   See note 10, above.RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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Was the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq  
morally justified?
Is the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq morally justified? As most just war the-
orists hold, some of the necessary conditions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in-
clude15: (a) a prospective war’s having a just cause; (b) its being declared by a prop-
er authority; (c) its possessing a right intention; (d) its having a reasonable chance 
of success; and (e) its end being proportional to the means used. I challenge the 
idea that the U.S. had a legitimate reason or cause to invade Iraq. And I take this 
as uncontroversial now that members of the highest-level of the Bush administra-
tion admitted that the evidence it provided for the invasion was somehow or other 
“mistaken.” And even if it is the case that the invasion was declared by a proper au-
thority, and even if it were true that the intent of the invasion was not to steal Iraqi 
oil but something noble, and even if at the outset there was a reasonable chance 
of the invasion’s success, one must also ask whether it was a justified proportion-
al response to depose Hussain by invading Iraq. There is no good reason to think 
that the military invasion of Iraq was necessary for the deposing of Hussain, as 
he could have been tried by the ICC and Iraq could have been spared the killings 
of hundreds of thousands of its people, and the wounding of yet untold numbers 
of others, and the destruction of its culture. Surely an acceptable motivation for 
such an invasion must amount to something more than “getting rid of Hussain,” 
as top U.S. officials often put it. And given that there were no weapons of mass de-
struction found, and that no evidence has been adduced to link the 9/11 terrorists 
to Iraq, part of the inference to the best explanation for the invasion is the theft of 
Iraqi oil by the U.S.. 
Thus given the just war criteria noted, the U.S. invasion of Iraq fails to satisfy at 
least the just cause and proportionality conditions. And no egoistic appeal to the 
protection of U.S. interests will work, as it begs important questions concerning 
the moral legitimacy of such interests. As Alan Gewirth states: “War crimes are 
crimes. As such, they are evil actions of murder, rape, torture, and other viola-
tions of basic human rights. Persons who commit, or order the perpetration of, 
such evils deserve severe punishment.”16 To this I add the claim that the declar-
ing or starting of an unjust war is a war crime and deserves punishment that is 
quite severe as the destruction of war is typically such that it is rightly classified 
15   John Rawls argues that “Well-ordered peoples, both liberal and decent, do not initiate 
war against one another; they go to war only when they sincerely and reasonably believe 
that their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw 
states” (Rawls 1999: 90–91). Rawls also notes that the right to go to war includes the right to 
defend one’s allies (Rawls 1999: 91). For a statement of general just war doctrine, see Rawls 
1999: 94–105. 
16   Gewirth 2001: 48.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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as evil.17 When hundreds of thousands of innocent people are killed, it is not 
merely a bad thing. It is evil, regardless of motive or intent, though it might not 
be pure evil which might well be called such because of its attending intent of the 
agent(s) most responsible.
It might be argued that the invasion of Iraq was morally justified in terms of na-
tion-building, that is, insofar as it replaced an allegedly morally problematic non-
democratic regime with a democratic one, and that democratic nation-building 
is so important in order to secure the basic rights of peoples that collateral dam-
age of even innocent lives is morally permitted under such circumstances. Indeed, 
this is just the kind of thinking that was expressed by the Bush administration at 
the commencement of the invasion. 
But this reason for the invasion of Iraq is problematic in multifarious ways. First, 
even if the U.S. rectified its evil past in order to avoid the moral hypocrisy attend-
ing its intervention into the affairs of another sovereign state, it is unclear that the 
hard paternalism inherent in such deposing of other governments that are not 
democratic is morally justified, as such a standpoint runs afoul of all sorts of diffi-
culties, not the least of which includes violations of national sovereignty, includ-
ing acculturation. In short, the alleged democratic rights that the invasion is said 
to install in the new “democratic” regime in Iraq are achieved at the cost of hun-
dreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi lives, not to mention the basic Iraqi right to 
sovereignty, including the right to choose one’s own form of government as one 
sees fit! If it is true that Iraq is guilty of human rights abuses, then reform from 
within, not replacement from without, of its government might be in order. And 
punishment of those most directly and strongly responsible for those abuses must 
be administered according to due process. No hard paternalistic view of what is 
“best” for Iraqis according to Westernized standards works here. Moreover, it 
must not be presumed that democracy is the best or even a good form of govern-
ment.18 We might recall the blistering critique of democracy by Socrates in Plato’s 
Republic. Here history is our wisest teacher, and it tells a horrific story of human 
rights abuses by the U.S. from its very inception to even this day, both domesti-
cally and globally. Furthermore, as I stated earlier, even if the preceding problems 
can be averted, the invasion and occupation of Iraq is hardly a proportional re-
sponse to a non-democratic government. It is, in short, morally absurd to think 
that the installation of democracy justifies the killing of so many Iraqi   civilians. 
Thus the argument from democratic nation-building amongst non-democratic 
nations or countries does not work here. 
17  Gewirth 2001: 49. Gewrith’s phrase is “resorting to war on wrongful grounds.” Also 
see Burleigh T. Wilkins’ claim that “planning and waging wars” also constitute war crimes 
(Wilkins 2001: 85).
18   One of numerous examples here is Hiley 2006. For a discussion of this book, see Corlett 
2006b.RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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Responsibility for the invasion and occupation of Iraq
In light of the fact that the invasion of Iraq was morally unjustified, who is to be 
held accountable for it and how ought they to be punished or otherwise sanc-
tioned? Many would argue that the trial of such war criminals ought to take place 
at the ICC or an International War Crimes Tribunal.19 Congruent with the ICC’s 
request that each country or nation take it upon itself to handle such matters ap-
propriately so that the ICC is seen as a court of last resort in such matters as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, I shall argue that citizens of the U.S. ap-
proach the U.S. war crimes in Iraq in the following manner. They must first bring 
formal charges against the officials most responsible for the invasion, and make 
them face trial in a U.S. federal court. But who in the U.S. ought to be tried and for 
what sorts of war crimes? And what principles might be adduced to decide how to 
punish such persons should they be duly found guilty of war crimes? 
And what of Obama’s belief that political reconciliation is a desideratum of han-
dling political conflicts, presumably of all kinds? It is important to point out that 
there seems to be no non-viciously question-begging argument for such a claim, 
and I have argued elsewhere that the very notion of political reconciliation pre-
supposes mercy, which in turn presupposes forgiveness (which is hardly a moral 
duty, especially in criminal justice contexts), which in turn requires genuine apol-
ogy by criminals which is rarely, if ever, forthcoming from even the most sorrowful 
criminals because it entails the rectification of wrongdoing which few, if any, of-
fenders are willing or able to offer.20 It is unreasonable to think that reconciliation 
ought to play any role in contexts of war crimes, except perhaps in cases where the 
bulk of those victimized genuinely desire reconciliation with their offenders who 
are genuinely remorseful and offer a substantial compensatory apology.21 Even in 
such instances, however, there must have been a prior relationship between the 
two groups to effect a re-conciliation, and such reconciliation is, morally speak-
ing, a moral prerogative (not a duty) of the victimized group. But in contexts of 
war crimes including hundreds of thousands of unjust killings, the expectation or 
requirement of reconciliation is questionable. What is needed is not reconcilia-
tion, but retributive justice. Perpetrators of such evils must get what they deserve 
in approximate proportion to their responsibility for their harmful wrongdoings. 
That is, war criminals ought to be punished in rough proportion to the harm they 
have wrongly inflicted on others to the extent that they caused the harm as re-
sponsible agents. The issue at hand with the U.S. military invasion of Iraq is not 
one of simple theft or error in judgment, it is evil of which we speak here: mass 
19   For cautions against this position and in favor of states holding their own war crimes tri-
als, see Wilkins 2001: 86f.
20   See Corlett 2006a: Chapter 5 for discussions of these points.
21   For an analysis of the notion of collective remorse, see Gilbert 2001.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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killings of innocents and the wholesale destruction of Iraq’s culture and infra-
structure. To insist that reconciliation, forgiveness or mercy ought to be expected 
of or forced on Iraqis against their wills and without proportional punishment of 
those U.S. leaders most directly and strongly responsible for those evils also pre-
supposes that hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi deaths are not worth even 
the proportional punishment of a handful of non-Iraqi U.S. lives most culpable 
for the Iraqi deaths! Such a view does not take responsibility seriously.
Who or what is most responsible for the atrocities wrought on Iraq? Who ought to 
be charged with committing war crimes in the wrongful invasion and occupation 
and the consequences that ensued and continue to ensue therein? Given that it is 
the U.S. Congress that voted to grant the president the authority to declare war, 
“it” certainly bears a primary responsibility for the invasion—especially those who 
voted in such a manner, like former Senator and current Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton. Thus those members of Congress who supported president Bush’s decla-
ration of war bear a great deal of responsibility for it. If not for their support, the 
invasion would not have occurred. Their recent claims that they were misled do 
not excuse them for not requiring better reasons to invade Iraq. They are formally 
educated persons who ought to know good reasons from poor ones, and had they 
actually listened to the voices of dissent in the U.S. and throughout the world and 
not been blinded by the “shock and awe” of 9/11, and had they exercised sufficient 
epistemic and moral responsibility regarding this matter of life and death as did 
representative Maxine Watters and a few others, they should have seen that the 
arguments provided for the invasion were clearly unsound and that the authority 
they were granting at that time to the president would very likely lead to the inva-
sion in question. So they must be tried for war crimes of the most horrible kind: 
effectively approving or supporting a conflict that will essentially be violent and 
result in death and destruction of many innocents. 
It is obvious that George W. Bush and some of his former cabinet members must 
be brought to trial for the same reasons, all on the principle that those who ap-
proved and supported the violence must be held accountable for the morally un-
justified use of political authority resulting in gross injustice. For they are those 
who had the most power to effect change in this set of circumstances.22 Moreover, 
they are responsible to the extent that they acted sufficiently intentionally, know-
ingly, and voluntarily23 in doing what they did to cause the harmful wrongdoings 
associated with the invasion. And no refusal to listen to dissenting voices serves 
as an excuse for their ordering or otherwise effecting an unjust military invasion.24
22   This principle of power to effect change is borrowed from French 1984.
23   These are the main conditions of responsibility as discussed in Corlett 2002.
24   For a recent statement f the legal case for war crimes against the Bush administration, see 
Bugliosi 2008. RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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But are there others besides the congressional members and the president and 
some of his members of cabinet who ought to be charged and tried for war crimes? 
What of former U.S. president Bill Clinton, who it is said signed into policy the 
invasion of Iraq? Those like Nicholas Calio25 who lobbied Congress to approve the 
war resolution bear primary responsibility also, as well as those in the highest-
level of the Pentagon, whether or not they really wanted to go to war, ought to be 
charged and tried in order to discover the precise level of their involvement and 
accountability. My impression is that some of them would in varying degrees be 
found responsible for the atrocity. However, one ought not to forget about cer-
tain highest-level business leaders, such as those at Haliburton and several other 
U.S.-based businesses such as Blackwater USA (now renamed “Z”), who are com-
plicit in the invasion and occupation. They too must be charged and tried for 
aiding and abetting or otherwise supporting substantially the committing of war 
crimes in their involvement in Iraq. Their punishments, if found guilty, must fit 
their “crimes.”26
Of course, there is the question of further military moral responsibility for war 
crimes in Iraq. Given that there are currently no conscripts in the U.S. military, a 
presumptive case for the responsibility of U.S. troops is justified, though to some 
extent the responsibility is mitigated on a case by case basis due to the strict au-
thoritative military hierarchy that delimits moral responsibility in such contexts. 
Yet such factors are less relevant, it seems, in cases where military troops are pri-
vately contracted by the U.S. and seem unaccountable to U.S. military rules as 
are regular U.S. military personnel. I have in mind here the hundreds of military 
troops of Blackwater USA, which (being supported by hundreds of billions of dol-
lars of Congressionally approved funding to assist with the invasion and occupa-
tion) is said to be responsible and on trial for the killings of numerous Iraqi civil-
ian non-combatants as well as Iraqi military who are defending their nation from 
the U.S. invasion and occupation. Since the invasion and occupation is morally 
unjust, then the question is not whether further U.S. military personnel ought to 
be punished, but how. And there are various levels of responsibility here just as 
there are at the governmental and business spheres of action concerning Iraq. As a 
general rule, those with the most power to effect change in a military organization 
are potentially more responsible for the war crimes than mere troops. But a care-
ful assessment of the facts of each case must be performed. Careful due process 
of law is needed. Some key questions here include to what extent each of those 
in the U.S. military hierarchy could have without significant reprisals refused to 
comply with the order to invade and occupy. And a similar question can be asked 
25   Nicholas Calio served as the assistant to president Bush from 2001–2003 and at the presi-
dent’s request lobbied Congress for approval of the Iraq war resolution.
26   For discussions of proportional sentencing, see Davis 1992; von Hirsch and Ashworth 
2005.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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of those at lower levels of role responsibility. The answers to these kinds of ques-
tions would determine how responsible each military officer is who was or is in-
volved in the killing of Iraqis and the devastation of Iraq.27
But what about U.S. citizens’ collective responsibility for war crimes? Is the U.S. 
citizenry morally responsible for the evils resulting from the invasion? If not, why 
not? And if so, who and to what extent of the citizens of the U.S. ought to be 
held legally accountable? (Assumed here is the congruence of the moral and le-
gal ideas of responsibility and that those who are morally responsible for such war 
crimes ought to be brought to justice legally). The U.S. citizenry collectively ought 
to charge itself with war crimes because of its clear majority support of the inva-
sion at least at the outset in its fervor of self-described patriotism,28 and because 
it was supportive of the invasion and failed to adequately question the reasons 
for it. In short, U.S. citizens were on average and as a class both morally and epis-
temically blameworthy and culpable for their support of the invasion. As “punish-
ment” for its strident and vocal support of the unjust invasion and occupation, it 
ought to instruct Congress to order the payment of substantial reparations to Iraq 
in proportion to the damages done, an issue to which I turn below. 
This is not the time for pacifistic calls for forgiveness and reconciliation where 
what is needed is due process and retributive justice for such war crimes. So the 
question before us is whether or not or to what extent the U.S. citizenry is respon-
sible for what many refer to as their government’s “terrorist” invasion of Iraq, and 
how it ought to be punished for what some refer to as state-sponsored military-
style terrorism.29 The U.S. citizenry is collectively liable for the atrocities com-
mitted against Iraq by the U.S., and this is true even though not distributively 
throughout the entire populace.30
27   Recently in San Diego, California, lance corporal Pennington and several of his military 
colleagues were tried for the killing of an Iraqi civilian during wartime. Their defense is in 
large part that the stress of war caused them to act in ways that clouded their better judg-
ments, and eventuated in the killing. Their defense attorneys argued that they killed the 
civilian because they thought that the safety of their fellow troops was at stake. They were 
recently tried but found not guilty of all major charges, and shall serve no time in prison for 
their killing of the Iraqi civilian, a fact that neither denies. One is reminded here of president 
Bush’s promise prior to the invasion that no U.S. troops would be punished for their service 
in Iraq. But one question to ask here is if such troops were rightly convicted of the war crime 
in question and duly sentenced to life in prison, how much more ought those who placed him 
there to be punished if duly convicted of war crimes of a much more serious variety, quanti-
tatively speaking?
28   Indeed, the U.S. public support for the invasion and occupation was for a few years just 
prior to and during the invasion so strong that several of those who even questioned its moral 
veracity were often angrily charged with anti-patriotism, or treason.
29   That states can engage in terrorism is argued in Corlett 2003: Chapter 5.
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But it might be objected that my argument is proceeding at too rapid a pace. For 
simply because the parties mentioned had various roles to play in what eventu-
ated in the evils in question does not imply that the U.S. parties mentioned are 
responsible for all of those consequences. All they are responsible for is the inva-
sion and occupation, but not the awful results that were “unforeseen” or “unin-
tended.” It is at this point of the argument that one might raise the problem of the 
doctrine of double-effect, arguing that it permits a certain amount of civilian car-
nage as the side-effects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction even 
if the U.S. used the weapons to attack combatants in the process of the invasion. 
“Briefly, the law states that one is sometimes permitted knowingly to bring about 
or permit as a side-effect of one’s actions something which it would be absolute-
ly impermissible to bring about or permit deliberately as an end or as a means.”31 
Thus those most responsible for the invasion are not, it is urged, responsible in 
the requisite sense for the collateral damage against innocent Iraqis. 
Now it is fair to ask how reasonable it is to think that anyone declaring a mili-
tary assault can expect to not harm innocents in significant ways, especially when 
weapons of mass destruction are used. My “Scope of Responsibility Principle,” 
states that “to the extent that I am responsible for X, and to the extent that I, be-
ing a reasonable person can understand, by way of common sense reflection, that 
X is likely to cause or lead to Y, I am also responsible for Y.”32 This implies that un-
der the circumstances, it is the burden of these parties to prove that mitigation or 
excuse obtains in their cases because it was unreasonable for them to think that 
their merely invading Iraq could possibly lead to the horrible results that have oc-
curred. I do not think that this is a serious consideration, especially the higher 
one “climbs” the ladder of responsibility. And while some findings of due process 
might dissuade me along these lines, there is at least sufficient evidence to justify 
the charges of war crimes and to permit the due process system to determine the 
guilt or innocence of the charged parties. Those who start wars are responsible for 
even the unintended deaths and other serious harms to innocents to the extent 
that a war or invasion eventuates in such collateral damage that can be foreseen 
by common-sense reflection. Like categories of moral justification, responsibility 
admits of degrees.
What are the harms experienced by Iraq at the hands of the U.S.?
Prior to addressing the matter of how those guilty of war crimes in Iraq ought to 
be punished if they are duly found guilty by a fair-minded panel of judges, it is vi-
tal that a preliminary estimate of the basic damages be made, even though dam-
ages are currently incomplete and perhaps grossly underestimated. First, there is 
31   Nagel 1979: 60.
32   Corlett 2006a: 25.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis by U.S. troops. While it 
may be argued that some such Iraqis were killed by coalition troops and that some 
of the Iraqi lives were taken as the result of strife between Muslims in the region 
and that the U.S. bears no responsibility for those deaths, it must be kept in mind 
that the U.S. spearheaded this invasion, and thus bears at least a shared responsi-
bility for even those Iraqis killed by non-U.S. military personnel, though it is not 
obvious what responsibility the U.S. has for the deaths that result from the inter-
Muslim strife. Further, while some might argue that those Iraqis who engaged U.S. 
troops in military combat ought not to be counted among the innocent, it must be 
borne in mind that the U.S. chose to, against the advice of much of the world, in-
vade Iraq. And given that the invasion is morally unjust, Iraqis clearly had a mor-
al right to self-defense against U.S. imperialist aggression. As John Rawls argues, 
unjust wars imply rights to self-defense of combatants and non-combatants alike 
by those in the unjustly attacked country, as well as those who sympathize with 
them and come to their defense.33 Assumed here is the truth of the claim that if 
anything is a moral right, self-defense against violent imperialism is. So the kill-
ings of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis is the primary responsibility of the U.S., 
and cannot plausibly be denied or distributed to others. Moreover, the very idea of 
reconciliation, forgiveness or mercy toward the U.S. in this case is a sign of a lack 
of moral courage to do what justice requires.34
Second, there is the physical and mental wounding of millions of surviving Iraq-
is, part and parcel of the non-lethal collateral damage of this unjust military in-
vasion. Third, there is the destruction of a sovereign nation, including its cul-
ture and infrastructure. Then there is the theft of Iraqi oil (one of the largest oil 
reserves in the world), which might well constitute a primary motivation for the 
33   See note 13.
34   For those who require a sound reason for punishing those who kill others unjustly, there 
is the Feinbergian one that to kill another is to set back their legitimate vital welfare and ulte-
rior interests in achieving certain morally legitimate goals that constitute our meaning in life. 
To kill another unjustly is to rob her of her most central interests in pursuing her own projects 
that in turn largely, if not wholly, define who she is. It is, in short, to extinguish another’s self 
that is necessary for the fulfillment of her projects that bring meaning to her life. And while 
death is surely not always or necessarily a harm to the one who dies, it is clearly such a harm in 
most cases for the reasons just cited. As Thomas Nagel puts it: “If death is an evil at all, it can-
not be because of its positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of” (Nagel 1979: 
1) After all, “If death is an evil, it is the loss of life” (Nagel 1979: 3). Moreover, “life is all we have 
and the loss of it is the greatest loss we can sustain” (Nagel 1979: 1). Insofar as punishment 
and compensatory justice are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that “any death is the 
loss of some life that its victim would have led had he not died at that or any earlier point. We 
know perfectly well what it would be for him to have had it instead of losing it, and there is 
no difficulty in identifying the loser” (Nagel 1979: 7–8). This is especially true concerning acts 
of unjust killings such as in Iraq. Thus the unjust killings of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis 
by the U.S. military demands justice, not forgiveness, mercy, or reconciliation!RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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invasion and occupation. These are just some of the major damages that Iraqis 
suffered as a result of the invasion and ongoing occupation of their nation by the 
U.S.. No doubt there are others.
I describe these effects of the unjust war as “evil,” and I do so with some conscious 
understanding of the meaning of the term. Feinberg analyzes the concept of evil 
as a complex array of different kinds of moral badness. Along the way, he cautions: 
“It is one thing to identify evils and quite another to understand or explain what 
we are saying when we pronounce a thing ‘evil.’ Few of us have any hesitation in 
judging things evil, but most of us find it surpassingly difficult to explain what we 
are doing when we make and support such judgments.”35 “‘Pure’ evil requires ex-
clusion,” he claims. “It is evil undiluted, two hundred proof, served in an old fash-
ioned shot glass and taken neat, without a chaser. It is all evil and nothing but 
evil, and its impact is unweakened as it ages.”36 I do not know if anything is “pure 
evil and nothing but evil,” as Feinberg states of the nature of pure evil. My claim 
is that the U.S. is, on balance, evil in its actions towards Iraq. The U.S. has com-
mitted a series of extremely harmful wrongdoings concerning that nation. And 
like most any unjust war, it has resulted in evil in the further sense of constitut-
ing extremely harmful wrongdoings, both qualitatively and quantitatively. This is 
important because the proper sentencing of offenders must, among other things, 
account for the degree or extent of their harmful wrongdoings. To intentionally 
engage in activities that common sense would lead one to think will likely eventu-
ate in the deaths of others is not evil, unless, of course, it turns out to be morally 
unjustified extremely harmful wrongdoing. And when this happens, a U.S. fed-
eral court must take into account the willful disregard of the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis by the U.S. in sentencing those from the U.S. found guilty of 
such war crimes.
Punishing the guilty parties
But how are these and other damages to be addressed in a U.S. federal court? 
What normative principles might be brought to bear to inform judges in order 
to exact justice in the fair and just sentencing of these war criminals? In Respon-
sibility and Punishment, 37 I have argued in favor of a retributivist or desert theo-
ry of punishment, the general plausibility of which I assume here. But I believe 
that much of what I argued therein can be applied to the case of war crimes in 
Iraq, both in terms of individual and collective responsibility and proportional 
35   Feinberg 2003: 144. For a discussion of Feinberg’s analysis, see Corlett 2004. For a social 
psychological study of evil, see Zimbardo 2007.
36   Feinberg 2003: 142.
37   Corlett 2006a: Chapter 4. For other retributivist analyses, see von Hirsch 1993, 1976, 1987; 
von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992; Kleinig 1973.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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  punishment of war criminals and compensation for war crime atrocities. While it 
is hard to imagine significant mitigating or excusing circumstances for those hav-
ing the most power to effect change who are guilty and responsible in this case, 
such mitigation seems to infect cases further down the ladder of responsibility in 
terms of governmental, military, and corporate responsibility. This must be kept 
in mind when making assessments of responsibility and punishment for such war 
crimes. Nonetheless, von Hirsch is correct in insisting that the general princi-
ple of “commensurate deserts” or proportional punishment is a “requirement of 
justice,”38 though it is not an absolute one and it admits of complexities of ordinal 
and cardinal desert,39 as well as a “living standard analysis” wherein the serious-
ness of crimes is judged by way of harm and culpability dimensions.40 Moreover, 
as Kleinig argues in response to the anchoring and adjustment problems of pro-
portional punishment: 
In relating punishments to offences, we simply reserve the mildest punish-
ment we can reasonably give for the least serious wrong, the most severe 
punishment for the most wicked deed, and scale other wrongs and punish-
ments in between, in accord with the pattern of scaling…We might wish 
to say that such a view incorporates both proportionality and equivalence; 
proportionality in that the more serious a wrong the more severe the pun-
ishment, equivalence in that the wrong and the punishment occupy the 
same relative position on their respective scales.41
In principle, I concur with Kleinig that considerations of proportional or com-
mensurate scaling can be done in a reasonably just or approximate fashion in or-
der to provide a substantial answer to the anchoring and adjustment problems. 
And I have provided a set of principles of proportional punishment that might 
serve as some rules of thumb in sentencing criminals such that they get what they 
deserve.42 Moreover, I believe that they can be applied effectively to the sentenc-
ing of U.S. war criminals in the case of Iraq. While problems of proportional sen-
tencing arise for any positive theory of punishment that seeks an exacting kind of 
commensurate sentencing of criminals, my retributivism depends on a less exact-
ing notion of proportional punishment that seeks to punish offenders in under-
determined ways, thus avoiding problems of possible over-punishment. As for the 
problem of “double-punishment” noted by Ryberg and others, it is misleading to 
refer to the side-effects of punishment as punishment itself. And since   virtually 
38   von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 197.
39   von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 209.
40   von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 220–232. See Ryberg 2004 for a criticism of proportional-
ism, and of von Hirsch’s proportionalism in particular.
41   Kleinig 1973: 124.
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anything one does in social life has side-effects on others, I consider this to be no 
meaningful concern for systems of punishment that are conscientious in their 
sentencing of criminals who acted with significant voluntariness and act the way 
they did to bring onto themselves the likely side-effects of punishment. Assumed 
here is a judicial system’s understanding of the conditions of prison life, and that 
prisons are administered in ways that do not undermine rights to humane treat-
ment such that whatever “double punishment” that accrues within them is mini-
mized both qualitatively and quantitatively.
I have argued that the general principle of proportionality admits of sub-princi-
ples that might guide the sentencing of criminals. For example, the “Matching 
Principle of Proportional Punishment” requires that, “as far as humanly possi-
ble, criminals ought to be punished in ways that match the extent of the amounts 
of harms that they illicitly wrought on others.”43 Punishment is hardly a science. 
But moral intuition and reasonableness must guide our application of plausible 
principles in determining how those guilty of the war crimes in question ought to 
be punished. Unless excusing or mitigating circumstances can be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt, it is reasonable to think that those with the greatest power to 
decide to invade Iraq deserve the harshest of sentences, while many soldiers and 
the remaining citizenry in the U.S. deserve far milder penalties, at least because 
of the government’s success in duping most of them about the evidence for war 
and due to their generally being inadequately educated with a critical conscious-
ness to recognize such trickery and fallacies when they arise. Here the words of 
Rawls are helpful:
As for soldiers of the outlaw state, leaving aside the upper ranks of an of-
ficer class, they, like civilians, are not responsible for their state’s war. For 
soldiers are often conscripted and in other ways forced into war; they are 
coercively indoctrinated in martial virtues; and their patriotism is often 
cruelly exploited.44
One standard of assessment here is whether or not it is reasonable to nonetheless 
hold the U.S. adult citizenry accountable for being seduced by such poor evidence 
and a perverted sense of patriotism.45 But for those of us who recognize that the 
U.S. economic system essentially prohibits the vast majority of U.S. citizens from 
receiving a higher education, and since critical thinking is not taught throughout 
the pre-college public school systems, it seems to be an overly demanding mor-
al standard to hold the bulk of U.S. citizens strongly accountable for not seeing 
43   Corlett 2006, 86.
44   Rawls 1999: 95.
45   For philosophical investigations of the concept of patriotism, see Primoratz 2002. Also 
see The Journal of Ethics 13:4 (2009) for a special issue devoted to the discussion of patriotism.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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through the mischievous “evidences” for the U.S. invasion and occupation. Even 
so, this epistemic factor only mitigates their responsibility. It does not excuse it. 
The U.S. citizenry, even in its willful or non-willful ignorance, has on balance sup-
ported the invasion and occupation until recently. And for most of those who now 
have doubts about it, their reservations seem always to be expressed egoistically 
in terms of how much “our” U.S. “troops” suffer from the tragedy. It seems never 
to be a concern about Iraqis who are killed and maimed by U.S. troops. Insofar as 
most U.S. citizens intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily supported the inva-
sion and occupation of Iraq, they are collectively responsible46 for it in a second-
ary sense, and must bear the burden of compensatory justice concerning their 
involvement.
Absent excusing or significant mitigating factors revealed during due process, 
those most responsible for the invasion and occupation of Iraq must be executed 
just as in the cases of many Nazi war criminals (and Hussain for his human rights 
violations), including Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, and others who are approxi-
mately as responsible as these leaders for the killings that were part of the unjust 
invasion and occupation, while others not too further down the chain of respon-
sibility deserve lesser but substantial punishments.47 Perhaps an appropriate pun-
ishment for members of the latter group of harmful wrongdoers would be to force 
such convicts into public slave labor in and for Iraq for the remainder of their lives 
in order to in some measure pay back to Iraq what they owe in partial remainder. 
Besides satisfying significantly Ryberg’s challenge of selectivity in cases where re-
sources do not permit the trying of each and every U.S. war criminal by suggest-
ing combined legislative and court-ordered punishments and penalties of vari-
ous levels and kinds of responsibility for such crimes, one moral principle at work 
here is that no one ought to be permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing,48 
while another is that proportional punishment requires that both over-punish-
ment and under-punishment be avoided as much as practically possible.49 My 
suggested sentencing admittedly violates the under-punishment requirement, 
though it seeks as best it can within the bounds of humaneness to approximate 
justice in terms of the higher end of proportional punishment for war crimes re-
sulting in great numbers of Iraqi deaths. 
46   For an analysis of collective responsibility, see Corlett 2002.
47   Assumed here is the idea that capital punishment stands among the harshest of state 
responses to severe war crimes, though one ought to remain mindful of Søren Kierkegaard’s 
remark that the torment of despair is not being able to die (Kierkegaard 1941: 150).
48   I borrow this principle from von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 399.
49   This point is found in von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 198.RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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Compensating Iraq
Moreover, another principle of proportional punishment is that those who wrong-
fully harm others must provide adequate compensation to their victims commen-
surate with the harms caused. While this principle is hardly applicable in every 
case due to the fact that many offenders are simply unable to provide such com-
pensation, this fact does not vitiate the justice of applying the principle when 
  offenders are able to provide some measure of compensation to their victims. 
As von Hirsch argues, “the aim of criminal justice should be to ensure that the 
  offender compensates the victim and the wider community for the loss inflicted 
by the crime.”50 Thus, of those highest-level White House, Congressional, Pen-
tagon, and business officials most strongly responsible for the war crimes of un-
just killings, all of their individual financial assets must be seized to provide an 
initial pool of billions in capital from which Iraqis can be partially compensated 
for the unjust killings. Those who attempt or assist in the attempt to wrongfully 
hide or transfer such assets either immediately prior to or after the charges made 
against the offenders would be tried for obstruction of justice and, if convicted, 
would face mandatory and severe punishment because it is a capital case they are 
obstructing. While this pool of billions of dollars of compensatory funds hardly 
suffices as just compensation for the harmful wrongdoings in question, the impo-
sition of a “flat” reparations tax on all U.S. citizens and businesses most directly 
responsible for the evils serves the purpose of supplementing the pool of com-
pensatory funding to more properly match the harmful wrongdoings suffered by 
the Iraqis as the result of the U.S. actions. The amount of such a tax should reflect 
the proper value of each Iraqi wrongfully killed, along with the cost of physical 
and mental healthcare for those millions of other Iraqis injured, and the cost of 
rebuilding the infrastructures of their towns and cities that were destroyed due to 
the invasion and occupation. From the mercenary activities of the likes of Black-
water USA, Dyncorp and Triple Canopy to munitions parts providers to food ser-
vices, each such business, whether U.S.-based or not, must be ordered to pay its 
fair share of reparations to Iraq. The greater the damage done to Iraq as a con-
tributory cause, the more liability each such business has and should pay to Iraq. 
The range for each case of business compensatory damages might be set at 1 mil-
lion dollars to 100 billion dollars, contingent of course on the facts of each case 
of harmful wrongdoing.51 Only careful and fair due process can hope to establish 
these amounts more precisely.
50   von Hirsch and Ashworth 1992: 401.
51   It has been argued that the United States and the European Union could organize and 
finance a generous program of reconstruction aid to compensate the Palestinians, which 
would terminate all claims for their actual return into what is now and will forever remain 
Israeli territory” (Mearscheimer and Walt 2007: 342–343). But this approach has a severe 
problem. Although it apparently seeks to correct the harmful wrongdoing that post-World 
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While there is a real sense in which even these reparations taxes, along with the 
complete asset seizures and public executions of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and 
some others fails to do sufficient justice in matching the harms suffered by Iraq at 
the hands of the U.S., it does represent an unprecedented ruling of justice relative 
to the U.S., and a continual reminder to U.S. citizens, government, military and 
business officials that justice demands the respecting of innocent peoples’ lives 
and cultures, and that the selection of political and business leadership is far more 
important than the typical U.S. citizen is led to believe. To the extent that such sen-
tencing by the federal court is enforced by a credible threat of coalition boycotts 
and embargos, etc., the U.S. will hopefully understand that it must change its “ways 
of empire” in order to even survive into the future. For it would mean that imperi-
alism is morally wrong and simply has too high a cost. And I should note that this 
feature of my view supports the Kantian justification of both the institution of 
punishment and its particular forms insofar as it allows for the secondary utilitar-
ian considerations to play a deterrent role regarding prospective war criminals.52
There is my “Punishment-in-Kind Principle of Proportionality:” “…proportionality 
permits at least the attempt of the state to impose on qualifying criminals those 
punishments that most closely resemble the kinds of harms the criminals have in-
flicted unjustifiably on others.”53 This is not a necessary condition of proportional 
punishment, but one that ought to be attempted in good faith whenever possible 
in light of the facts of the case.54 Although the matter of reparations does not sat-
role in committing some of the world’s worst human rights atrocities against Palestinians. So 
then why is Israel not deemed a worthy perpetrator and required to pay substantial repara-
tions to Palestine, for say, at least the duration of its immoral occupation of Palestinian lands 
and killings of thousands innocent Palestinians? While my approach in this chapter seeks 
only to address U.S. responsibility for war crimes against Iraq, it hardly excuses Israel of its 
substantial debt of compensation to Palestinians and the military-backed command that Is-
rael relinquish those territories immediately into Palestinian hands. Nor does my approach, 
were it to focus its attention on the punishment of war crimes against Palestinians, ignore the 
moral need to punish with impunity those Israeli leaders most directly responsible for the 
human rights violations leading to the killings and maimings of so many Palestinian citizens. 
Insofar as it is plausible to think that the Israel lobby (including Israel’s government itself) 
had much to do in shaping the U.S. decision to invade and occupy Iraq, then those most 
directly responsible for such influence bear responsibility for the severe harmful wrongdoing 
and merit severe punishment for their actions, failed actions, or attempted actions, as the 
case may be. While Mearmescheimer and Walt do not fail to include the Israel lobby as a 
primary influence on the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, they seem to give Israel and the Israel 
lobby a “pass” when it comes to punishment and compensation for the evils of the ongoing 
atrocity given their respective roles in it.
52   See, for instance, Corlett 2006a: 45–46, 54.
53   Corlett 2006a: 89.
54   As Rawls writes of one of the conditions of morally justified civil disobedience, it is a 
“practical condition.” (Corlett 2003: 34–35).RepARAtIOnS FOR U.S. WAR CRImeS AgAInSt IRAq J. ANgELo CoRLETT
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isfy the Punishment-in-Kind Principle of Proportionality, capital punishment of 
the most egregious offenders does, though in a grossly underdetermined manner. 
For it to some minimal extent begins to match the wrongful killings of so many in-
nocent Iraqis because of the directives of the Bush administration. My point is that 
it is a just (e.g., a roughly proportional) punishment nonetheless, and that a care-
fully composed coalition of states might well be able to impose the punishment 
should the U.S. system of justice fail to impose it, consonant with Rawls’ claim that 
the non-compliance of outlaw states can be met with coalition states’ resistance 
in order to bring such outlaw states into compliance with norms of international 
justice.55 But that coalition must possess the wherewithal to combat the U.S. mili-
tarily, if necessary, and in compliance with the basic tenets of just war theories.
Each of these punishments, if imposed by a U.S. federal court, would bring a sig-
nificant measure of justice to the circumstance in question. In this way, they satisfy 
the “Harm-Based Principle of Proportional Punishment:” “An offender’s suffering 
from a form of punishment or compensation must both adequately compensate 
the victim [or the victim’s surviving significant other(s)] as much as possible, and 
negate the economic, social, etc., advantage(s) the offender gains by committing 
the offense…”56 The infliction of capital punishment on those most directly and 
strongly responsible for the killings of Iraqis addresses those deaths, however in-
adequately. And the seizure of their assets along with reparations by the U.S. gov-
ernment and U.S.-based businesses most responsible for the invasion and occu-
pation addresses the matter of roughly adequate compensation to Iraqis for both 
the numerous killings of Iraqis by the U.S. military as well as the other damages 
mentioned. Again, while this set of sentences is inadequate to fully address the 
harms to Iraqis by the U.S. government and some of its businesses, it is perhaps 
unprecedented in world history, it cannot reasonably be faulted for being insignif-
icant in amount or insensitive to Iraq’s harms. Nor can it be faulted for being un-
enforceable. In the end, even if a carefully constructed coalition of countries and 
nations does not occur due to overwhelming fear of U.S. retaliation, terrorism, as 
a form of self-defense and/or retribution is sometimes a morally justified option 
in taming outlaw societies, as I have argued at length elsewhere.57 However, this 
mode of justice must be enacted subsequent to various attempts in good faith to 
work for justice by way of non-violent and legal channels as I have argued here.
Furthermore, the suggested punishments reflect well Joel Feinberg’s expressive 
functions of punishment:58 authoritative disavowal, symbolic non-acquiescence, 
55   Rawls 1999: 80–81, 93.
56   Corlett 2006a: 96.
57   The conditions of morally justified terrorism are found and defended in Corlett 2003: 
Chapter 5.
58   Feinberg 1970: 101–105.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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vindication of law, and absolution of others. In punishing harshly those most 
  responsible for the war crimes against Iraq, the U.S. citizens publicly condemn 
what they did, affirming innocent Iraqi rights to peace and tranquility. In punish-
ing these U.S. war criminals, the U.S. citizens disavow what these leaders did that 
was evil. In so doing, they “speak in the name of the people” in an act of symbolic 
non-acquiescence which publicly denounces the invasion and occupation as fun-
damentally unjust. This acknowledges the U.S.’s collective responsibility for these 
atrocities as the citizens pay reparations to Iraq for the damages caused by U.S. ac-
tions. In punishing the political, military and business leaders most responsible, 
the U.S. vindicates the best of law, assigning punitive damages where appropriate, 
and absolves to some extent those least responsible for the war crimes in question, 
sending a strong message that the U.S. is then no longer a country that either per-
petrates or tolerates such evils, and that future severe harmful wrongdoings will 
also be punished with appropriateness and due harshness.
To be sure, these are not the only principles of punishment that can be brought to 
bear on this matter. But I argue that they are some of them that must be taken into 
account as much as possible. When intentional actions have resulted in the loss of 
many innocent lives, due process and, if justified, punishment of those most re-
sponsible must be harsh and imposed without apology. Let us not forget that it is 
the offender who owes the apology for what she has done to her innocent victims, 
and genuine apology requires among other things adequate compensation to the 
victims by the offending parties. 
Nagel writes that “We have always known that the world is a bad place. It appears 
that it may be an evil place as well.”59 What we have in the case of the U.S. inva-
sion and occupation of Iraq is a case where an evil bully has chosen to kill persons 
for her own selfish reasons, and kill by the hundreds of thousands in the name of 
“freedom and democracy.” As I see it, this is a paradigmatic instance of evil. And 
forgiveness and mercy have no place where evil runs rampant.
One irony here is that, with so many U.S. citizens complaining about how much the 
“War with Iraq” is costing the U.S. (some estimates range to over $1,000,000,000.00 
by the time of its supposed “end”), it might cost much more than that in terms of 
reparations the U.S. owes to Iraq for unjustly invading and occupying it. Yet few in 
the U.S. even contemplate this scenario. Given the facts of the unjustified status of 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the U.S., and given that most of the harm-
ful wrongdoing is caused by the U.S., what does the U.S. owe Iraq? 
Let us assume, conservatively, that 250,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed by U.S. 
troops. Again, we must estimate the value of a human life taken so violently. Con-
servatively, I estimate that each Iraqi life taken was worth at least $10,000,000.00 in 
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part because these days in the State of California a person molested by a   Catholic 
priest is awarded, on average, 1.2 million dollars and many wrongful death cases 
in the U.S. draw more than $20 million each. Are we to assume that Iraqi lives are 
worth any less than what a typical U.S. life would be worth in comparison to the 
value of a priestly molestation? On the assumption that the answer to this ques-
tion is negative, we can then calculate that what the U.S. owes Iraq for the Iraqi 
lives taken is at least $2,500,000,000.000.00.
But there is also the matter of the destruction of virtually the entire Iraqi infra-
structure mostly by the U.S., and the destruction of the Iraqi civilization and cul-
ture. There is also the matter of the U.S. needing to clean up all of its war toys 
and take them home where they “belong.” For they surely do not belong in Iraq! 
The cleanup efforts alone would cost the U.S. billions and years to accomplish. 
Although it is difficult to put a price on such matters, perhaps the U.S. can be 
“taught a hard lesson” by the awarding of Iraq a 1% in perpetuity “Iraq Repara-
tions Tax” that would be taken from the gross annual incomes of all adult U.S. in-
come earners. This can be calculated in conservative terms by multiplying the es-
timated number of adult U.S. incomes60 (currently, 100,000,000) by the average 
U.S. gross annual income (currently, at least $30,000) = $3,000,000,000,000.00 / 
1% = $30,000,000,000.00. (30 billion USDs) each year in perpetuity. The fact that 
this would be perceived by most U.S. citizens as a rather high in perpetuity figure 
helps to offset the horror of the invasion and occupation, and the littering of most 
of the landscape of Iraq with U.S.’s own weapons of war. It is also meant to convey 
the high price that must be paid by oppressors to the victims of oppression whose 
religion has been forced to endure all manner of abuse as the result of the propa-
ganda spread by the U.S. about Islam, as well as the civilization and utter confu-
sion and lawlessness that ensued as the U.S. began its occupation. It is also meant 
to reimburse Iraq for the oil usurped by Haliburton in order to fuel the invasion 
and occupation, among other things. And those politicians, military and business 
leaders who are most responsible for the invasion and occupation of Iraq should 
have their personal assets seized in order to form an initial pool of compensato-
ry reparations to Iraq in addition to the payment of reparations by U.S. citizens.
So the U.S. should by congressional order pay Iraq an amount of 1% of the total 
gross annual incomes of U.S. citizens, to be verified each year by an audit by an 
agency of Iraq’s choosing, and paid for in full by the U.S. as part of its reparations 
to Iraq. Should this be refused or impossible, attempts at reparative justice for Iraq 
must be made through the U.S. federal court system, and, if necessary, by way of 
the ICC.
But this is not the end of the story of what the U.S. is morally required to do vis-
à-vis Iraq. The aforementioned reparations are based on the assumption that the 
60   Estimated data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census.StUDIeS AnD ARtICLeS
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U.S. is required to completely vacate Iraq within 2 years, a promise made by U.S. 
president Barack Obama as he campaigned for office. As a genocidal invader, the 
U.S. has no moral right to be in Iraq, and it must use the 2 years to attempt in good 
faith to restore (at U.S. expense) Iraq to its former conditions prior to the invasion. 
Infrastructure must be rebuilt at U.S. expense, and within 2 years before the U.S. 
vacates Iraq completely, never to return until and unless explicitly invited by Iraq 
or unless the basic just war conditions are satisfied,61 or until the conditions of hu-
manitarian intervention62 or the duties of assistance are satisfied.63
Conclusion
The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is a moral travesty of grand proportions. 
Those most responsible for it owe far more than they ever pay. But pay they must. 
Proportional justice suggests that they who are duly found guilty of war crimes 
against Iraq of the kind discussed herein must have all of their assets seized in 
order to pay part of what is owed to Iraq in damages caused by the war criminals. 
But the war criminals must also be executed for their war crimes. Finally, the U.S. 
has a moral duty to pay reparations to Iraq at an estimated 1% of each adult wage 
earner’s annual salary in perpetuity. This is primarily a desert-based judgment 
grounded in the notion of U.S.-rights violations of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
civilians killed by U.S. military and paramilitary troops. This is not the time for 
morally cowardly calls for peace and reconciliation between the U.S. and Iraq. It is 
time for retributive justice. And should the U.S. fail or refuse to heed the call for 
such justice, it will continue to experience what the bin Ladens of this world have 
to offer in terms of a deadly response to U.S. militarism and hegemony. 
primljeno: 15. decembar 2012.
prihvaćeno: 22. decembar 2012.
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J. Anđelo Korlet
Odšteta za ratne zločine SAD protiv Iraka
Apstrakt
Imajući u vidu osnovna načela pravednog rata, kao i načela kompenzacijske pravde 
pravnog poretka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, autor zastupa stanovište da je američka 
invazija na Irak, od 2003. godine do danas, moralno nepravedna i da SAD duguju znat-
nu odštetu Iraku.
Ključne reči  kompenzacijska pravda, Irak, teorija pravednog rata, odšteta, Sjedinjene 
Američke Države, ratni zločin.